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ABSTRACT 
Many network attacks forge the source address in their IP packets to block traceback.  Recently, research activity 
has focused on packet-tracing mechanisms to counter this deception.  Unfortunately, these mechanisms are either 
too  expensive  or  ineffective  against  distributed  attacks  where  traffic  comes  from  multiple  directions,  and  the 
volume in each direction is small. 
We  believe  that  the  fundamental  solution  to  the  problem  of  source  address  forging  is  to  validate  source 
addresses throughout the network.  We have developed a source address filtering protocol that establishes and 
maintains  valid  incoming  interface  information  on  source  addresses  at  each  router,  thus  allowing  all  packets 
carrying improper source addresses to be immediately identified. Our protocol works correctly in the presence of 
asymmetric routing. We will describe the protocol that gathers the information to validate source addresses and use 
simulation to demonstrate that it is effective and has reasonable costs. 
Keywords:  IP spoofing, DDoS, filtering, security 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Attackers commonly forge source addresses to hinder tracing of their malicious packets.  Examples include DDoS 
attacks [32], smurf attacks [31], and TCP SYN flooding attacks [24].   Reliably detecting the attacker is hard 
because standard routers cannot verify that a packet was indeed sent by the node specified in its source address. 
Periphery filtering is widely used to validate source addresses [12].  A 
periphery router ensures that a packet leaving its domain has a source address 
from inside the domain, and a packet entering has one from outside; but 
unless periphery filtering is deployed everywhere, nearly arbitrary forgery is 
still possible.  For example, in Figure 1 an attacker in network SM can send 
packets into network SB with source address from network SA, even though 
both A and B support periphery filtering.   
Figure 1: Periphery filtering 
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A router can check a packet’s incoming interface
1 with forwarding-table-based filtering [1], where a packet is 
expected to arrive through the same interface that is used to send packets back to the source.  Unfortunately, this 
does not work when asymmetry exists.  If the incoming interface for an address is different from the outgoing 
interface for that address, valid packets from that address will be dropped.  For instance, if routing between A and B 
in Figure 1 is asymmetric, packets from network SA will be dropped by router B.  According to [17], a path through 
the Internet in 1995 visited at different cities in each direction 50% of the time, and different autonomous systems 
30% of the time.  Asymmetry in the Internet is common, not exceptional, so filtering must account for it. 
One approach to the problem of IP spoofing is tracing.  Since source addresses are unreliable, tracing requires 
expensive and complicated techniques to observe traffic as they pass through routers and reconstruct a packet’s 
travel path at the end.   Tracing also becomes ineffective when the volume of attack traffic is small or the attack is 
distributed.  Moreover, tracing is typically performed after an attack is detected, and perhaps the victim has already 
been damaged.  Since tracing usually already needs to add new functionalities to routers to observe or mark traffic, 
we believe the most valuable functionality to add is one that will directly prevent IP spoofing.   
We  propose  incoming-table-based  filtering  to  filter  packets  that  carry  forged  source  addresses.    In  this 
approach, a router on the Internet builds an incoming table that specifies the correct incoming interface for a given 
source address, even with asymmetric routing present.  When a packet arrives on an interface, a router can consult 
its incoming table to determine whether this packet comes from the proper direction.     
Apart from IP spoofing prevention, source address validation has many other advantages.  Attack tracing tools 
can use the knowledge of address validation and routers that perform it to narrow the possible sources of an attack.  
Intrusion detection and network problem diagnosis can also be simplified.  Services that rely on accurate source 
addresses  (congestion  control,  fair  queuing,  source-based  traffic  control  schemes)  also  profit.    Reverse  path 
forwarding  (RPF)  can  be  more  effective;  multicasting  protocols  that  use  RPF  to  build  reverse  shortest-path 
multicasting trees (such as DVMRP [8], CBT [2] and PIM [9]) can thus build true shortest-path trees. 
This paper describes a protocol used to build and maintain an incoming table and the philosophy underlying the 
design.  We call this protocol the source address validity enforcement protocol (SAVE).  It can be deployed on 
routers running different routing protocols with reasonable cost.  The protocol is described in Section 2.  Section 3 
discusses advanced issues, including compatibility with legacy routers, soft state maintenance, overhead control, 
                                                            
1 Incoming and outgoing interfaces of a router can be physical network interfaces identified with a link-layer address, or logical network interfaces identified 
with a unique IP address.   3
and  interaction  of  filtering  with  some  special  cases,  such  as  mobile  IP  and IP  multicast.    Section  4  presents 
simulation results on the costs of running the protocol and demonstrations of its efficacy, and Section 5 discusses 
related work.  Future work is discussed in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7. 
2  THE DESIGN OF THE SAVE PROTOCOL 
2.1  Overview 
The goal of the SAVE protocol is to build a table at each participating router that indicates the router’s proper 
incoming interface for packets from all sources.  The router will use packet source addresses to index the table, 
dropping packets that come in on interfaces not matching the table entries. 
One might think that building an incoming table is conceptually the reverse of building a forwarding table, and 
thus a minor alteration to existing routing protocols, but actually the tasks prove very different.  SAVE needs a 
greater knowledge of other routers’ behavior than standard routing protocols require.  Figure 2 shows an example.  
After route calculation, router 1 knows that there are two equal-cost paths from router 6 to itself.  If router 1 only 
has knowledge of its neighborhood, it cannot determine the incoming interface for packets from 6 which could be 
arbitrarily far away.  Router 1 needs to know how 6 breaks routing ties.  Assuming 6 prefers the lower address, 1 
still needs to determine which path from 6 to 1 starts with a router of lower address.  In Figure 2 (a), a packet from 
6 to 1 arrives via 3; and in (b), due to a difference in the upstream topology, it arrives via 2. 
SAVE builds the incoming table at each router in a distributed fashion, 
using information in a router’s forwarding table to signal to other routers the 
proper packet paths.  SAVE must determine which paths other routers have 
chosen  to  reach  all  destinations.  Each  router  sends  SAVE  updates  to  all 
destinations in its forwarding table, sending a new update when routing to a 
destination is changed.  SAVE updates traverse the same paths as normal IP 
packets traverse.  Each router in the path records the incoming interface used 
by the SAVE update as the legitimate interface for packets from upstream routers.  Once all routers have sent such 
SAVE updates to all their destinations, each router will have a complete set of legitimate sources for each incoming 
interface.  This information can be used to build an incoming table. 
(a)  (b) 
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Merely keeping a list of interfaces and corresponding addresses is insufficient.  If routing changes alter a 
source/destination path at an intermediate router, the source router might not change its next hop interface, so that 
router will not generate SAVE updates for its address space.  Organizing SAVE’s information in an incoming tree 
solves  this  problem.    The  tree  structure  stores  the  upstream  router’s  address  space  as  a  descendent  of  the 
intermediate  router’s  address  space,  so  a  change  in  intermediate  router’s  interface  automatically  changes  the 
upstream router’s interface.  For example, in Figure 2 router 7 delivers packets to router 1 through router 6, so 
changing the delivery path for packets from router 6 to router 1 also changes the delivery path from router 7 to 
router 1, even though router 7 has not changed its routing information.  By using a tree for 1’s information, where 
7’s address space is the child of 6’s address space, the update that changes the interface used for router 6’s address 
space will also change the interface used for 7’s address space. 
Since all of the Internet’s multiple routing protocols produce a forwarding table, we avoid developing multiple 
versions of SAVE by working with the common forwarding table.  Topology factors like node or link failure and 
routing policies are automatically handled by underlying routing protocols.  SAVE extracts its update information 
from each router’s forwarding table, and any changes to the forwarding table trigger new SAVE updates.  
Deployment of SAVE-enabled routers will be incremental,  so new routers must coexist with legacy routers.  A 
neighboring  legacy  router  will  not  help  establish  the  incoming  table  of  a  SAVE-enabled  router,  except  by 
forwarding control messages that can be treated as IP packets.  SAVE is designed with this constraint in mind. 
Ultimately, this protocol must work at Internet scale.  Like routing protocols, the scaling factors are related to 
IP address space size and number of routers that must run the protocol.  This paper analyzes the basic scaling costs 
of the SAVE protocol. A future version of the protocol will further improve SAVE’s scalability through more 
address space aggregation.  Similarly, since the purpose of this protocol is to defeat attacks, the protocol itself must 
be secure from attacks to offer any benefit.  We do not discuss security issues in detail here, but touch upon them in 
the future work section. 
2.2  Protocol Description 
In this section we describe the SAVE protocol.  We illustrate the formation and adjustment of the incoming tree and 
the creation of the incoming table at a router.  We also describe the generation of SAVE updates at origin routers 
and their handling at intermediary routers.  The structure of the protocol is outlined in Figure 3.   5
2.2.1  Assumptions 
For ease of understanding and discussion, we make the 
following assumptions.  Assumption (a) and (b) list only the 
properties of a router required by SAVE, separating each 
router  from  the  specific  routing  protocols  that  it  runs.  
Assumption  (c),  (d)  and  (e)  are  not  mandatory  and  their 
relaxation will be discussed later.  (In particular, we will 
address compatibility with legacy routers in Section 3.1, reliability in Section 3.2, and security in Section 6.)   
(a) Each router has a forwarding table with each entry in the form <prefix, out_if> that specifies out_if as the 
outgoing interface for a particular address space prefix.   
(b) Each router is associated with a source address space; packets from this space reach the outside world via this 
router.  (Note: this router is not necessarily the first hop to reach outside; for example, the default exit border 
router of an autonomous system (AS) can regard the whole AS as its source address space.  We assume that 
an independent procedure exists for determining source address spaces.) 
(c) Every router runs the SAVE protocol. 
(d) SAVE updates between routers are reliable; they are never erroneous, lost, duplicated or out of order. 
(e) SAVE updates between routers are secure. 
2.2.2  Generation of SAVE Updates 
SAVE  updates  are  generated  when  the  system  is 
initialized and when changes in a router’s forwarding 
table  occur  (Figure  4).    A  state  is  assigned  to  each 
forwarding entry: a newly added or updated forwarding 
entry is set to state todo and a processed one is set to 
state done.  A router’s SAVE updates are generated by 
iterating through its forwarding table.  A SAVE update 
is created for each forwarding entry <S, out_if> in the 
todo state and sent out along out_if towards S inside an IP datagram.  (The handling of a removed forwarding entry 
will be addressed in Section 3.2.)   
Procedure: SAVE update generation at router R. 
 
1  SR :      the address space associated with router R 
 
2  [Initialization] 
  reset the state of each forwarding entry e: state (e) todo 
 
3   Iterate through the forwarding table 
4    loop: for each forwarding entry e: <S, out_if> 
5            if (state(e) is todo)   
6              compose SAVE update F: 
                F  <S, ASV=<SR>, a=1> 
7              send F out along interface out_if 
8              state(e)   done 
9    goto loop 
 
Figure 4: SAVE update generation procedure 
Figure 3:  The architecture of the SAVE protocol 
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A SAVE update contains a destination address space S, an address space vector ASV, and a flag a.  The flag a 
indicates whether more information should be appended to the update along its way toward the destination (to be 
discussed in Section 2.2.4).  When a SAVE update is initiated, its ASV only contains one element the source 
address space associated with the origin router.  
Table 1 illustrates the SAVE update generation for the topology shown in Figure 5.  This topology has six 
routers A through F, each having an associated address space SA through SF, respectively. iXY denotes the interface of 
X that has a direct link with router Y (X or Y=A, B, C, D, E, F).  SF includes SD  and SE.  Table 1 shows a partial 
snapshot of forwarding tables that are relevant to reaching F and the corresponding SAVE updates. 
2.2.3  Incoming Tree Creation and Maintenance 
The incoming tree at a router maintains the information about valid interface for every source address.  It has 
two aspects.  (1) Each node on an incoming tree represents an address space.  On router R’s incoming tree, a node 
for address space A will be a child of a node for address space B if packets from A must cross B to reach R; the root 
of the tree is the source address space of R.  For a given node on the tree, its path to the root corresponds to a 
sequence of address spaces crossed to reach R.  (2) Each node on the tree maps to an incoming interface.  All nodes 
of a sub-tree directly under the root will be associated with the same incoming interface.   
An incoming table can be easily constructed from an incoming tree.  Nodes with same interface may be further 
aggregated.  The table’s data structure can also be designed to achieve the best efficiency for validating source 
addresses of packets.  
Each SAVE update carries an ASV: <S1, S2, …, Sn>.  When this update is received at router R, its ASV indicates 
that packets from address space Si (i=1, 2, …, n-1) will cross Si+1, Si+2, …, and Sn, and perhaps other address spaces 
after Sn, to reach R. 
A:  *  iAB    <*,  <SA>, 1> 
B:  SF  iBF    <SF, <SB>, 1> 
C:  SF  iCB    <SF, <SC>, 1> 
D:  *  iDF    <*,  <SD>, 1> 
         
E:  *  iEF    <*,  <SE>, 1> 
F:  SD  iFD    <SD, <SF>, 1> 
  SE  iFE    <SE, <SF>, 1> 
  *  iFB    <*,  <SF>, 1> 
 
Table 1: A partial snapshot of forwarding tables at routers in Figure 5 and 
the corresponding SAVE updates 
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Figure 5: An example topology used in 
SAVE protocol description   7
A SAVE update alters a router’s tree (Figure 6).  Its 
ASV is parsed in reverse.  If the last ASV element Sn 
does not exist in the incoming tree, it will be grafted 
directly under the root; if the current interface bound 
with Sn is not F’s incoming interface, the Sn sub-tree 
will be remapped to the new interface and grafted under 
the root.  Any other element of ASV, Si (i n), and its 
whole  sub-tree  is  grafted  under  previously  processed 
element  Si+1.    Figure  7  shows  the  incoming  tree  for 
router F in Figure 5.   
2.2.4  Handling of SAVE updates 
Upon  receipt  of  a  SAVE  update,  in  addition  to 
updating its incoming tree and incoming table, a router also decides 
whether to and how to forward the update to other routers.  A SAVE 
update may be modified before leaving the router.  Figure 8 describes 
the handling of a SAVE update at a router. 
SAVE update forwarding 
Whether or not to forward a SAVE update is determined by checking the SAVE update’s destination address 
space.  If a router is the last hop to reach all machines represented by the destination address space of the SAVE 
update, it does not forward the update.  Otherwise, the next hop is determined from the local forwarding table.   
To  ensure  that  the  forwarding  of  the  update  covers  all  routes  that  IP  packets  use  to  reach  the  update’s 
destination address space, the forwarding table is searched for related entries.   There are two types of related 
forwarding entries:  the subset type and the superset type.  A subset-type entry’s destination field is a sub-area of 
the update’s destination address space (line 7 in Figure 8); a superset-type entry’s destination field is an address 
space covering the whole destination address space (line 21 in Figure 8).  When forwarding an IP packet toward 
anywhere in the destination address space, the subset-type forwarding entry will be used first.  If the all subset-type 
entries combined cannot cover the whole destination address space, the smallest superset-type forwarding entry will 
also be used (assuming that forwarding of IP packets uses the longest match).   
Procedure: Incoming tree update at router R 
 
1  SR  : the address space associated with router R 
2  U: a newly received SAVE update 
            U = <S, ASV, a>, where ASV=<S1, S2, …, Sn> 
3  iface: the incoming interface that U arrives on 
4  subtree(X)  : a sub-tree of the incoming tree rooted at X 
 
5  [Initialization] The tree has only the root representing SR 
6  for (i   n; i > 0; i-- ) 
7    if (Si does not exist in the incoming tree) 
8      if ( i = n )  
9        graft Si under the root  
10        associate Si with iface 
11      else 
12        graft Si under Si+1 
13    else 
14        if ( i = n )    
15          if (iface   the current interface associated with Si) 
16            graft subtree(Si) under the root 
17            change association of Si to iface 
18        else  
19            graft subtree(Si) directly under Si+1 (if not yet) 
20      end  
 Figure 6:  Incoming tree update with a given SAVE update 
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Figure 7: The incoming tree of router F in Figure 5  8
Corresponding  to  IP  packet  forwarding 
behavior,  the  SAVE  update  is  forwarded  as 
follows.  For each subset-type entry, a SAVE 
update is sent toward the indicated sub-area of 
the  destination  address  space  (lines  17  in 
Figure 8), and its destination address space is 
replaced  with  the  sub-area  address  space.  
Furthermore, if the combination of all the first 
type  entries  does  not  cover  the  whole 
destination  address  space,  the  smallest 
superset-type  forwarding  entry  will  be 
used a  SAVE  update  is  sent  along  the 
interface  specified  by  this  entry  and  the 
original  destination  address  space  is 
unchanged (line 22 in Figure 8).  Thus a router 
forwards  one  or multiple copies  of a  SAVE 
update. 
Modification of SAVE update 
A router must append its own source address space to the ASV of a SAVE update whenever the appending flag 
a of the update is set to 1 (line 6 in Figure 8).  The ASV thus records an ordered continuous sequence of address 
spaces crossed; such order determines the relative position of these address spaces on an incoming tree. 
Overhead control of SAVE updates 
If a router appends its source address space to a SAVE update, it is unnecessary to initiate another update 
toward the same destination.  Both updates would be treated the same by downstream routers. 
But it is not always necessary to append a router’s source address space to a SAVE update.  While a router’s 
incoming tree should record all the address spaces that a SAVE update has crossed, the update’s ASV is allowed to 
be a partial list of them, provided: (1) the rest are contained in other updates already initiated by any routers 
upstream; (2) combining all these updates will still provide the full sequence of the address space crossed.  So, 
Procedure: SAVE update handling at intermediary router R.   
  SR :  the address space associated with router R 
  U : a newly received SAVE update 
    U = <SD, ASV, a>, where ASV=<S1, S2, …, Sk> (k 1) 
 
1  if (router R is the last hop to reach all the machines in SD) 
2    return 
3  if ( SR   (S1 S2 … Sk) )  /* replaceable SAVE update */ 
4    return 
   
5  if ( a = 1) 
6    ASV  <ASV, SR> /* append SR; now ASV=<S1, S2, …, Sk, SR> */ 
 
7  Define set E={forwarding entry ei | ei = <SDi, out_ifi> && SDi   SD }  
8  Define an empty address space S 
9  for every ei in E /* inform all the sub-areas */ 
10    if (a = 1)   
11        if ( state(ei) is done ) 
12          ai 0 
13        else 
14          state (ei)    done 
15          ai 1 
16    Ui   <SDi , ASV, ai> 
17    forward Ui along outgoing interface out_ifi 
18    S   S   SDi   
19  end loop 
 
20  if ( S   SD) /* we don’t entirely cover SD with sub-areas */ 
21      find forwarding entry e: <SD , out_if  > where SD    SD, such that, 
if there is another ei : <SDi, out_ifi> where SDi   SD, then SD    SDi 
22      if (e is found) 
          forward U along outgoing interface out_if   
 
Figure 8: The handling of a SAVE update   9
when handling a newly received SAVE update, if an intermediate router has previously initiated another SAVE 
update  toward  the  same  destination,  the  address  spaces  to  cross  after  this  router  are  already  recorded  in  all 
downstream routers.  The router therefore marks the new SAVE update to be no longer appendable by downstream 
routers (by zeroing its flag a as in line 11 to 12 of Figure 8).   
Overhead can be further reduced by not forwarding replaceable SAVE updates.  A SAVE update is replaceable 
by the router if each address space in its ASV is inside the router’s source address space.  The source address space 
in SAVE updates initiated by this router already covers the address spaces carried by the replaceable update, thus 
this update should be consumed by the router (lines 3 to 4 of Figure 8).     
2.2.5  Conflicting SAVE Updates 
If a router forwards multiple copies of a SAVE update (see Section 2.2.4 above), another router may receive 
several of them from different directions, but it must use only one of them to update its incoming tree regarding the 
common address spaces carried by these copies.  In Figure 9, router R forwards two copies of the update F, one 
toward r, the other toward R.  The latter is further forwarded from R to r.  Finally, with two copies of F, r must 
decide which one to use for the area crossed prior to A. 
When forwarding multiple copies of a SAVE update, 
a router calculates a priority for each copy, assigning a 
higher priority if the update is forwarded using a more 
specific forwarding entry.  Router r in Figure 9 will thus 
use the higher priority update from the solid path.   
3  ADVANCED ISSUES 
SAVE needs to handle compatibility with legacy routers, incoming tree state maintenance, and overhead control.  
Mobile IP and IP multicasting also need special handling.  We discuss security issues and deployment in Section 6.  
3.1  Compatibility with Legacy Routers 
Compatibility with legacy routers plays an important role in designing SAVE.  The incoming interface information 
must still be correct when legacy routers are present.  This requires that a SAVE update be forwarded correctly 
even across legacy routers.  Furthermore, SAVE needs to account for address spaces of legacy routers. 
Figure 9: Conflicting SAVE updates at router r 
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Each SAVE update is carried inside an IP packet, where the destination address of the encapsulating IP header 
must belong to the destination address space of the update.  When a legacy router receives a SAVE update, it will 
simply treat it as an ordinary IP packet and forward it to next hop.  We are investigating the case in which multiple 
copies of a SAVE update are to be forwarded. 
Legacy routers also complicate the maintenance of incoming trees.  Since a legacy router will not send out 
triggered SAVE updates when its routing path to a destination is changed, the incoming tree at downstream routers 
will not be updated promptly.  Periodic resending of SAVE updates from upstream SAVE-enabled routers solves 
this problem.  This matches the soft-state maintenance in SAVE (Section 3.2). 
Finally, if the source address space of a legacy router is not included in the source address space of a SAVE-
enabled router, it is not be reported, and thus is not known to any incoming table.  Thus, a SAVE-enabled router 
cannot  easily  distinguish  legacy  router  source addresses from  forged  addresses.    A  SAVE-enabled router  can 
discard non-existent IP addresses by checking against its forwarding table or by utilizing out-of-band information.   
If  the  IP  address  exists,  it  can  switch  to  forwarding-table-based  filtering  for  them.    This  approach  will  drop 
legitimate packets from legacy routers if the routing is asymmetric, but will properly handle many cases.  We will 
further investigate the issue in our future work. 
3.2  Soft State Maintenance 
Each node’s incoming tree is treated as soft state, and it can expire unless reinstated with repeated SAVE updates.  
Use of soft state simplifies the protocol design by automatically discarding obsolete information without the need 
for specific notification.  When a forwarding entry is removed, it is not necessary to explicitly repair the incoming 
tree.  Similarly it smoothly handles SAVE updates caused by transient routing behavior and asynchronous delivery 
of SAVE updates.  Soft state also solves the problem of handling routing changes when SAVE updates cross legacy 
routers (see Section 3.1). 
Overhead control of soft state refreshing messages is not particular to this research and has been studied 
elsewhere.  Scalable timers [25] and a new proposal for RSVP refreshes [30] both address this problem. 
Finally, soft state handles reliability issues.  It has been shown that a probabilistic delivery model with relaxed 
reliability is suitable for soft-state-based communication, where judicious use of feedback from receivers greatly 
improves state consistency [20].   11
3.3  Overhead Control With Two-Level Routing Infrastructure  
The SAVE protocol has three types of overhead: bandwidth cost, processing overhead, and storage.  The number of 
SAVE updates sent by a router is proportional to the size of its forwarding table.  Controlling SAVE update 
overhead was discussed in Section 2.2.4.  The design there matches the two-level routing infrastructure of the 
Internet.  Since all packets from an AS to the outside must cross a border router, and the whole AS space is the 
source address space of the border router, those SAVE updates from within an AS are all replaceable and will not 
leak to the outside through this border router.  In the other direction, the SAVE updates from outside an AS need to 
be distributed into the AS.  We are investigating the aggregation of these updates.  
3.4  Special Case Handling 
3.4.1  Mobile IP 
Mobile IP often relies on maintaining the home address of a given mobile host regardless of its location [18].  
A  packet  from  a  mobile  host  will  always  carry  its  home  IP  address.  With  source  address  filtering  enforced, 
however, such packets would be rejected whenever the mobile host is outside of its home network, since generally 
they use different path to the destination from the remainder of that home network. 
Reverse tunneling for Mobile IPv4 has been proposed [16], by which a packet from a mobile host in a foreign 
network will be tunneled back to its home agent first, which then forwards the packet to the destination.  In IPv6, a 
packet from a mobile host in a foreign network will be stamped with a care-of address, an address belonging to the 
foreign network.  Both approaches resolve the potential conflicts between address filtering and mobile IP. 
3.4.2  IP Multicast routing 
IP multicast can benefit from the SAVE protocol.  Multicast routing protocols such as DVMRP [8], PIM [9], or 
CBT  [2]  use  a  reverse-path-forwarding  technique  to  build  a  reverse  shortest-path  tree.    When  building  a 
multicasting tree, a SAVE-enabled router can take advantage of having an incoming table.  It can determine the 
previous hop of the truly shortest path from the root to itself, not the reverse shortest path using RPF.   
Upon receipt of a multicast packet, a router can be in one of the two phases regarding the packet: the packet is 
being sent towards the root where it will be further propagated towards the whole multicast group, or the packet is 
being propagated from the root.  In the former situation, the router should validate whether the multicast packet is 
from the sender.  In the latter situation, the source address of the root should be validated, the same way as it does   12
for unicast packets.  In DVMRP, the root is the sender; in CBT, the root is the core router of the multicast group; in 
PIM, it is the rendezvous point of a multicast group when a shared tree is used, and the sender otherwise.   
4  SIMULATION 
4.1  Simulation Goals 
The SAVE protocol has been implemented and tested in a simulation environment. We have performed extensive 
simulation runs to obtain the following information: (1) whether all bad packets (i.e. packets with forged source 
addresses) can be successfully detected and dropped; (2) whether good packets (i.e. packets with authentic source 
addresses) are dropped erroneously; and (3) the cost of the SAVE protocol. 
4.2  Simulation Design 
In our simulation we assume that all routers run the incoming-table-based filtering.  Corresponding to the two-level 
routing infrastructure of the Internet, we simulated BGP [21] for inter-domain routing and RIP [15] for intra-
domain routing.  Our BGP simulation implements the following policy as recommended by Cisco [14]: 
•  Each router in a transit domain runs BGP. A border router in a stub domain runs both BGP and RIP. 
•  Stub domains are non-transit domains, whether single-homed or multi-homed. 
•  In each stub domain, there is one preferred exit BGP router for outgoing traffic. All outgoing traffic will use this 
router even if alternative routes have lower link cost to some destinations. 
•  In a transit domain, the router prefers the routes with the shortest AS path attribute for each destination.  
We used the transit-stub model from GT-ITM software to generate domain-level connectivity and intra-domain 
connectivity [6].  We also used the AT&T Worldnet IP backbone topology for a transit domain in some scenarios 
[11].  Data traffic in our simulation is UDP and generated according to Poisson traffic models.  
4.3  SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.3.1  Effectiveness Verification 
To verify the effectiveness of the SAVE protocol, we set up a traffic model for data packet senders.   Each 
sender sends out both good packets and bad packets controlled by two independent Poisson processes with different 
rates.  If the incoming-table-based filtering is effective, we expect that the distribution pattern of filtered packets 
over time will match the traffic model of sending bad packets.  Since the asymmetric case is common in Internet-  13
scale routing, we also include some asymmetric routes in our simulations.  Asymmetric 
routes could be introduced by link failure, or already exist in the initial topologies as in 
Figure 10.  
The following two experiments illustrates the behavior of SAVE: 
Experiment1: We evaluated the behavior of incoming-
based-filtering for the topology shown in Figure 10.  All 
packets  are  sent  from  node  6  to  5,  with  bad  packets 
spoofing  a  source  address  in  router  1’s  address  space.  
There is an asymmetric route between node 5 and 6.  When 
the  link  between  1  and  4  fails,  node  0  discovers  the 
alternate  path  to  5  via  2.    Thus  an  asymmetric  route  is 
changed  to  a  symmetric  one.    On  recovery,  routing 
becomes asymmetric again.  
The result is shown in Figure 11.  Incoming-table-based filtering detects and drops all bad packets.  Good 
packets that arrive on asymmetric links are not dropped while the routing is stable. When a link has failed or 
recovered, transient changes in routing tables result in inconsistency of incoming tables. Some good packets are 
dropped during that period (67 to 72 seconds). 
Experiment  2:  In  this  experiment  we  evaluate  the 
behavior of the filtering mechanism for the topology shown 
in Figure 12 without link failures.  The topology consists of 
one transit domain and 12 stub domains.  All packets are 
sent  from  nodes  62,  66  and  70  to  node  72,  where  bad 
packets spoof source addresses from the address space of 
router 1.  An asymmetric route is formed between node 70 
and 72 since 56 is the default exit router for domain 12.  
The result is shown in Figure 13. It demonstrates that 
incoming-table-based  filtering  detects  and  drops  all  bad 
packets, even though they are generated from multiple sources. No good packets are dropped.  
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Figure 11: Filtering behavior in Experiment1 
A topology generated using transit-stub model, except domain 0 in 
the middle borrows from the AT&T Worldnet IP backbone 
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Figure 13: Filtering behavior in Experiment2  
Every packet has a global unique sequence number.  (Here, good 
packets are not shown.) 
4.3.2  The Cost of the SAVE Protocol 
SAVE updates are analogous to routing updates in that the 
former are used for building incoming tables and the latter for 
forwarding tables.  In this section, we measure the bandwidth and 
storage cost of the SAVE protocol and compare them to routing 
protocol  costs.    For  a  fair  comparison,  we  compare  RIP  with 
SAVE using the same broadcast interval, and we compare BGP 
with SAVE using infinite refreshing time.  Theoretical analysis of 
these relative costs is given in Appendix A and B. 
We have measured the following costs of both SAVE and 
routing  protocols  (RIP  and  BGP):  (1)  bandwidth the  total 
overhead exchanged by protocol messages in the whole network. 
The overhead of each message is counted every time it crosses a 
link; and (2) storage the average cost per node for the incoming 
table and tree in SAVE and the routing table in routing protocols. 
The total bandwidth cost of the protocol has two parts: (1) static overhead for initial setup; and (2) dynamic 
overhead for updating the incoming table and tree in SAVE and the routing table in routing protocols. 
Figure 14 shows the static bandwidth cost in single-domain topologies for SAVE and RIP.  Figure 15 shows the 
static bandwidth cost for multiple-domain topologies, where we measured the inter-domain bandwidth cost of 
SAVE and compared it with that of BGP.  Ten different topologies were tested for each topology size.   
Both graphs show that the cost of the SAVE protocol is a power function of the number of nodes, proportional 
to Num_Nodes
k
 where 2<k<3. Bandwidth cost within a single domain is comparable to the RIP cost, while the cost 
of running the SAVE protocol in multiple-domain networks is approximately three times greater than BGP cost. 
To measure dynamic overhead, we introduced link failures in the same topologies used to measure the static 
cost.  We observed that the incurred bandwidth cost by SAVE varies depending on the topology and location of 
failed links.  In some scenarios SAVE has lower cost than BGP, while in others it is at most three times larger. 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the size of the incoming table and tree for single-domain and multiple-domain 
topologies, respectively.  Figure 16 shows the cost of SAVE incurred for storing intra-domain information.  Figure   15
17 shows only the cost incurred for storing domain-level information.  These costs are compared with the size of 
the routing tables of RIP and BGP.  The storage cost of SAVE for single-domain topologies is at most three times 
larger than RIP’s.  The storage cost of SAVE for multiple-domain topologies is significantly lower than BGP’s. 
5  RELATED WORK 
Research  on  network  security  has  focused  on  end-to-end  approaches,  typically  through  authentication  and 
encryption (IPsec is one representative at the IP layer [13]).  To guarantee a packet’s authenticity, it can be signed 
or encrypted.  The high computation overhead of cryptographic operations prevents such approaches from being 
widely employed per packet.  These operations also require key establishment for every pair of communicating 
nodes on the Internet.  Finally, this approach still cannot prevent a site from being flooded by DDoS-style attacks. 
IP spoofing has been addressed in other research through both preventive approaches and reactive approaches.  
Filtering is a preventive approach.  Tracing is mostly reactive. 
Filtering as a general approach has been proposed in [1], where many fields, including but not limited to source 
address, can be used for filtering.  Martian address filtering is required to discard packets if their source addresses 
are special addresses (loopback address, broadcast address, etc.) or are not unicast addresses.  For validation of 
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Figure 17: Storage cost for multiple-domain topologies 
y = 229.83x
2.0862
RIP
y = 137.94x
2.2367
SAVE
0.00E+00
1.00E+06
2.00E+06
3.00E+06
4.00E+06
5.00E+06
6.00E+06
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of nodes
S
t
a
t
i
c
 
b
a
n
d
w
i
d
t
h
 
c
o
s
t
 
(
b
y
t
e
s
)
 
Figure 14: Static bandwidth cost comparison between SAVE and RIP 
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Figure 15: Static bandwidth cost comparison between SAVE and BGP   16
source address in general, the forwarding table is used to validate the incoming interface of packets.  This feature is 
often disabled by default, because it leads to erroneous packet dropping when asymmetric paths are used.  
A popular filtering approach is periphery filtering that can be deployed on a firewall as well as an edge router 
[12].  But unless it is deployed everywhere, an attacker can still easily forge source addresses, as shown in Figure 1.  
Packet tracing has been widely studied.  The various approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses.  In 
Bellovin’s approach, each router samples packets with low probability and sends the sampled router adjacency 
information to the destination via ICMP traceback messages, allowing the destination to reconstruct the path [3].  
Probabilistic packet marking encodes the path information in the ID field of an IP header [23].  This approach is 
incompatible with IPsec, which disallows modification of the ID field.  Logging and link testing can also be used 
for tracing [5][26].  As pointed out in the introduction section, tracing is either expensive or ineffective.  On the 
other  hand,  our  filtering  approach  and  tracing  techniques  are  complementary.    Source  address  filtering  eases 
tracing, while tracing is also necessary when only partial deployment of filtering is possible. 
Network  intrusion  detection  has  also  studied  how  to  localize  an  attacker.    For  instance,  DECIDUOUS 
dynamically builds IPsec security associations to reveal the location of attacking sources [7].  However, to do this a 
victim running DECIDUOUS must detect the intrusion first; network topology information is also required. 
6  FUTURE WORK 
Open issues for the SAVE protocol include its security, aggregating SAVE updates, incremental deployment of 
new filtering-based routers, and incorporating this filtering mechanism with other networking techniques. 
 The SAVE protocol itself must be secured or attackers will merely compromise it first before taking other 
steps to perform their attacks.  In particular, the process of building the incoming tree at each router must be 
protected.  SAVE updates must be protected while crossing a chain of routers.  End-to-end encryption provides 
secrecy and integrity of SAVE updates, but it inhibits intermediary routers from accessing, modifying, and using 
transient SAVE updates.  An alternative is to use a series of signatures digitally signing a SAVE update and re-
signing its subsequent versions to allow a destination router to verify a SAVE update’s authenticity,  as has been 
suggested by active network researchers for their own purposes [29].  Any authentication-based approach must 
address the fact that there is no ubiquitous authentication mechanism for the whole Internet.  Since a SAVE update 
may traverse different autonomous domains, something must be done to provide inter-domain authentication.   17
Overhead control deserves further study.  The aggregation of SAVE updates arriving at a router is one potential 
solution.  The address space vector in a SAVE update, for instance, may be further aggregated.  The storage of the 
incoming tree and incoming table can also be saved with address space aggregation.  
Incremental deployment of SAVE is another open issue.  One interesting problem is how to assess the benefit 
with partial deployment.  For instance, in contrast to random deployment, if all backbone routers employ filtering, 
the efficacy appears more promising.   
A new network protocol will be more successful if it can be smoothly incorporated with other networking 
techniques.  We have shown SAVE’s compatibility with mobile IP and IP multicasting, but there are still other 
arenas to consider.  For instance, IP tunneling complicates source address validation in two ways.  First, the true 
source address of a packet is buried inside a wrapping IP header that contains the source address of the ingress of a 
tunnel.  Source address filtering could verify that the IP address of the ingress is legitimate, but could not generally 
determine if the true internal source address was legitimate.  Second, legitimate packets that emerge from a tunnel 
may be dropped due to deviation from a normal path caused by tunneling.  IP source routing is similar to IP 
tunneling in that a packet may also reach its destination via a different path than normal [10] [19].  SAVE also 
seeks to work with new developments in packet routing research, such as the per-hop behavior in differentiated 
services [4], multipath routing [27], and multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) [22]. 
7  CONCLUSION 
Network attacks pose an increasing danger to the Internet community.  The source addresses of malicious packets 
are often forged to hinder discovery of the attacker. Existing methods of overcoming this problem (periphery 
filtering, filtering based on forwarding tables, or various tracing techniques that discover the physical path of 
malicious packets) all have limitations in their cost or effectiveness.  In this paper we present a practical and 
effective approach to detect improperly addressed packets. 
We developed the SAVE protocol to enable routers to check source address validity.  This protocol handles 
cases of asymmetric routing correctly. We demonstrated through simulation that the incoming table built by the 
protocol properly detects forged IP addresses, except during transient periods following routing changes.  The 
incoming table produced by the SAVE protocol can be used for purposes other than filtering. Valid incoming   18
interface information is also beneficial for many techniques (such as RPF) that currently assume symmetric routing 
and forward packets on non-optimal routes. 
The SAVE protocol's operation is independent of the underlying routing protocol.  Simulation results show that 
the bandwidth cost of the SAVE protocol is comparable with that of routing protocols, and its storage cost is quite 
small.  Known optimizations could reduce this overhead in the future. 
We have addressed many difficult issues for this kind of protocol, such as handling mobile IP, reliability, and 
some aspects of aggregation and scaling.  Other hard issues will be addressed in future work, including partial 
deployment, security of the protocol, and more aggressive aggregation to provide better scaling properties. 
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APPENDIX A:  COST COMPARISON BETWEEN SAVE AND RIP  
Consider a network of N routers where every router has k neighbors.  Let ESRIP be the entry size of a routing table.  
Every RIP router periodically broadcasts updates to all k neighbors.  The size of every update is proportional to N. 
Total bandwidth cost per broadcast per router is 
RIP
RIP
Broadcast ES N k BWC * * = .   We assume that for every topology 
change there is a probability pe that it will affect a given entry in a routing table. The change of this routing entry 
triggers updates to all k neighbors.  Total bandwidth consumed by all triggered updates per topology change is 
RIP e
RIP
Trigger ES N k p BWC * * * = .  The storage cost per router is 
RIP
RIP ES N SC * = .   
In SAVE, each router generates a SAVE update for every forwarding table entry and sends it towards the 
destination.  Let UA denote the size of address space information within a SAVE update, and d be the mean 
diameter of the network.  Every SAVE update is forwarded d hops on the average, and every router on the path 
appends its address space to the update.  Total bandwidth consumed per router is  .
2
* ) 3 ( * * N d d U
BWC
A SAVE
Broadcast
+
=   We 
assume that every routing table change affects the corresponding entry in the forwarding table and triggers SAVE 
updates.  The total incurred bandwidth per router is thus 
2
* ) 3 ( * * * N d d U p
BWC
A e SAVE
Trigger
+
= .  Let ESSAVE and ESTREE 
denote the size of an entry in an incoming table and tree.  The storage cost per router is  ). ( * TREE SAVE
SAVE ES ES N SC + =   
The ratio of bandwidth cost of the SAVE protocol vs. bandwidth cost of RIP for both broadcast and triggered 
updates is  ) (
* * 2
* ) 3 ( *
2
k
d
O
ES k
U d d
RBWC
RIP
A =
+
= .  The storage cost ratio of SAVE vs. RIP is 
RIP
TREE SAVE
ES
ES ES
RSC
) ( +
= .   
APPENDIX B:  COST COMPARISON BETWEEN SAVE AND BGP 
Let A denote the total number of ASs on the Internet, M the mean AS distance (in terms of the number of ASs), and 
NW the total number of networks.  We assume that the networks are uniformly distributed among the ASs, and every 
BGP router peers with k other BGP routers.     20
For BGP cost evaluation, we use the discussion in [28].  After the initial BGP connection setup, the peers 
exchange a complete set of routing information, and each BGP update groups NW/A NLRI entries for every AS. 
Each BGP router sends routing information about all NW networks.  Denote ESNLRI the size of a NLRI entry in a BGP 
routing  table,  and  ESAS  the  size  of  the  AS-PATH  attribute.    The  average  size  of  a  BGP  update  is  thus 
AS NLRI W
BGP ES M ES A N BWC * * ) / ( + = .  The complete routing information consists of A such updates.  The total bandwidth 
used during the setup phase per router is  ) * * * ( * AS NLRI W
BGP
Setup ES A M ES N k BWC + = .  We assume that for every topology 
change there is a probability pe that it will affect a given entry in a routing table.  The average bandwidth cost per 
topology change for each router is  ) * ( * * * AS NLRI W e
BGP
Change ES M ES k N p BWC + = .  The storage cost for each BGP router is 
) * ( * * AS NLRI W
BGP ES M ES N k SC + = .  
We compare the bandwidth cost of inter-domain SAVE updates with the cost of BGP updates.  Let D denote 
the mean inter-domain distance in terms of the number of hops.  At initialization, every border router sends a SAVE 
update to each destination network in its forwarding table.  Let UA denote the size of address space information in a 
SAVE update. Every update, on the average, travels D hops before it reaches the destination network
2, and every 
router on the path appends its address space information to the update. The total bandwidth used by a router for the 
initial setup is therefore 
2
) 3 ( * * * +
=
D D U N
BWC
A W SAVE
Setup .  If every routing change leads to a change in the forwarding 
table, the bandwidth of trigged SAVE updates per topology change is 
2
* ) 3 ( * * * A W e SAVE
Change
U D D N p
BWC
+
= .  Since a 
SAVE router stores the incoming table and tree at the AS level, the storage cost of SAVE is  ) ( * TREE SAVE
SAVE ES ES A SC + = .  
The bandwidth cost during setup of SAVE relative to BGP is 
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*
(
) * * * ( * * 2
) 3 ( * * *
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=  The 
bandwidth cost in the  change  phase  of  SAVE  relative  to  BGP is 
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storage cost of SAVE relative to BGP is 
)
* *
(
) * ( * *
) ( *
M N k
A
O
ES M ES N k
ES ES A
RSC
W AS NLRI W
TREE SAVE =
+
+
= .   
                                                            
2 Note that once the update reaches the destination network it still needs to be distributed to all interior routers. This incurs some bandwidth cost. Let n be the 
number of interior routers and d the average distance from them to the border router, then there will be additional UA*n*d*(d+3)/2  bandwidth consumed for 
each SAVE update that reaches the border router. Since we are calculating pure inter-domain cost of SAVE, we do not include this additional cost here.  